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A Comparative Perspective: Recognition of
the "Continuous Injury" Trigger in
Insurance Law in the United States and the
United Kingdom
BY EMALIE DIAZ SUNDALE*
I. Introduction
The standard Commercial General Liability coverage form
obligates an insurer to indemnify the insured for bodily injury and
property damages caused by an "occurrence" during the policy
period.' The form defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same harmful
condition."2 When an injury occurs over a period of time, questions
arise in pinning down a precise moment when such a continuous
injury begins.' The question of whether the resulting injury is
covered under a given insurance policy, or, whether the insurance
policy has been "triggered," vexes courts in the United States and the
United Kingdom alike.'
*I am immensely grateful for the direction, wisdom and patience of Professor Leo P.
Martinez, Albert Abramson Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
1. Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form No.
00011207 at 1, reprinted in LEO P. MARTINEZ & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INSURANCE LAW 1007 (7th ed. 2013) (hereafter "MARTINEZ & RICHMOND").
2. MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 1, at 1020.
3. ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW,
521-22 (4th ed. 2007) (hereafter "JERRY & RICHMOND"); MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra
note 2, at 446-51 (citing Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878 (Cal.
1995)).
4. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 523-25; MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra
note 1, at 446-51 (citing Montrose, 913 P.2d 878); MALCOLM CLARKE, POLICIES AND
PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 195-96 (2007) (hereafter
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The California Supreme Court has noted that, while the term
"trigger" is not found in the language of Commercial General
Liability policies, "'trigger of coverage' is a term of convenience
used to describe that which, under the specific terms of an insurance
policy, must happen in the policy period in order for the potential of
coverage to arise."'
In both the United States and the United Kingdom, courts
employ four different trigger-of-coverage rules.6 The "manifestation
trigger" requires indemnity only for injuries that manifest themselves
during the policy period.' The manifestation trigger provides narrow
coverage and is problematic because it leaves insureds without
claims in the future and shifts liability on to the most recent
insurers.8 The "exposure trigger" holds liable those insurers whose
policies were in effect when the injured party was exposed to the
harm.9 While the exposure trigger is broader than the manifestation
trigger, if injury results from exposure prior to the policy period, the
insured might not receive the coverage she reasonably expected.'0
The "injury-in-fact trigger" provides coverage beginning when the
injured demonstrates an actual injury." This trigger can closely
resemble the "continuous injury" trigger, but difficulties can arise in
determining exactly when the injury arose.12
This discussion focuses on the fourth and broadest trigger: the
"continuous injury trigger," also called the "triple trigger" or
"multiple trigger."l3 The continuous injury trigger combines the
first three triggers and holds liable any insurer whose policy was in
effect during the progression of the injury.' 4 Both the United States
and the United Kingdom, albeit at different speeds and with
different scopes, have employed a form of the "continuous injury
trigger" to determine the "when" of insurance coverage for injury
"CLARKE").
5. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 881 n.2.
6. Id.
7. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 525.
8. Id. at 526.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 894.
12. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 527.
13. Id. at 528.
14. Id.
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or harm occurring over time.15
In the United Kingdom and the United States, while the legal
bases for recognition of the continuous injury trigger differ, both
jurisdictions are influenced by common themes that support
recognition. First, because trigger of coverage issues are not well
addressed in existing policy language, courts in both jurisdictions
employ interpretive tools to assess trigger of coverage issues and to
recognize the continuous injury trigger. The lack of pertinent
language allows for considerable freedom of action by the courts.
Second, as a close corollary, courts are concerned with maintaining
the integrity of the insurance contract and ensuring that the insured
receives the benefit of her bargain: indemnity. Third, the continuous
injury trigger is particularly well-suited to satisfy both jurisdictions'
need to address the unique problem of ongoing injury or harm insured
by multiple insurers. The continuous injury trigger provides a
workable solution to the problem of multiple insurer liability over a
period of years without undermining the integrity of the insurance
contract. Moreover, in the face of globalization, movement toward a
more uniform approach to trigger-of-coverage issues provides
predictability of outcomes for insureds and insurers alike; this sort of
consistency is especially important because the type of trigger
applied can have substantial implications for the extent of coverage.
When multiple insurance policies are at play, the exact time that
coverage is triggered informs which parties are responsible for
indemnifying the loss and thus informs the remedy available to the
injured party.1 When more than one insurer is liable for a given loss,
a host of questions arise in the allocation of defense obligations and
amount of indemnity.17 In some jurisdictions in the United States,
insureds can stack primary policies and aggregate the total policy
limits to ftilly compensate the amount of the loss. In the United
Kingdom, it is less clear because recognition of the continuous injury
trigger is recent. At the very least, insurers in the United Kingdom
are jointly and severally liable for continuing injuries occurring
during applicable policy periods.19 In both jurisdictions, however,
15. CLARKE, supra note 4, at 195.
16. Id.
17. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 529.
18. MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 1, at 446-51.
19. CLARKE, supra note 4, at 196. Recognition of the continuous injury or "multiple"
trigger in the United Kingdom, however, is, thus far, limited to continuous injury resulting
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recognition of the continuous injury trigger protects the interest of
the insured and works to maximize coverage.
This note is necessarily limited to examination of the factors
contributing to the adoption of the continuous injury trigger of
coverage. The ensuing discussion touches on insurer contribution
issues only to demonstrate the scope of redress available to insureds
to illustrate the importance of applying the correct trigger of
coverage. The choice between triggers of coverage reflects the
complicated nature of the problem of multiple insurers for a single
continuous injury or harm. Moreover, given the recent recognition of
the continuous injury trigger in the United Kingdom, confining this
note to discussion of the continuous injury trigger aims to facilitate
further academic discussion into corollary issues. Thus, this note
does not address the details of "other insurance" clauses and
horizontal or vertical exhaustion issues because these issues are more
fully developed in the context of a continuous injury trigger.
This note has four sections. The first section offers a brief
introduction to the importance of considering trigger-of-coverage
issues comparatively. The second section discusses the legal bases of
the continuous injury trigger as it was formulated in the United
States. The third section recounts the recent and short history of the
development of the multiple trigger for insurance coverage of
asbestos-related claims in the United Kingdom. The final section
analyzes the comparative differences between the United States and
the United Kingdom, focusing on the effect of judicial approaches on
insureds.
II. Globalization and Triggers of Coverage Issues
Comparing judicial approaches to trigger of coverage for
progressive injury or damage cases is an important and worthy
endeavor.2 0 From a broad perspective, substantive comparative work
from asbestos exposure. See Bevan, infra note 86, at 217.
20. My comparative analysis is subject to the following disclaimer: cultural and legal
systems are always more complicated, more nuanced, than our words can convey, but
considering, analyzing, thinking about how legal systems working conjunctively and
disjunctively, is a necessary endeavor. Recognizing bias is an important first step in
communicating ideas respectfully. I am a United States citizen, who is a student of United
States law and my aim here is to conduct a comparative analysis with a respectful and
deferential tone. Moreover, due to my place in one of the countries occupying the "center" I
may not be as well equipped to recognize what I overlook as those comparative scholars in
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is increasingly important in a rapidly globalizing society.2 1 According
to some scholars, globalization has shifted the distribution of power
among global actors; where the nation-states once controlled the
markets, the markets now control the nation-states.22 The insurance
industry especially benefits from the diffusion of power once held
firmly by the nation-state.23 Indeed, in the face of this landscape,
uniformity and clarity in insurance law is even more important as
insureds and insurers alike look more toward market practices and
less toward the nation-states. This prospect increases the need for
robust academic discussion around global insurance law principles.
This need is underscored by the scarcity of academic writing on
substantive insurance law in the United Kingdom.2 4
These considerations are compounded by the nature of
seemingly innocuous continuing injury and damage. These types of
harms are difficult to detect and are so substantial that they are
exactly the type of risk for which insureds seek indemnity. Trigger of
coverage issues in the United States and United Kingdom, then, are
no small matter. They directly determine whether the insured
receives the benefit of her bargain.
III. United States
A. Legal Bases for Recognizing the Continuous Injury Trigger
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to recognize the
continuous trigger in the United States.2 5 In Keene Corporation v.
Insurance Co. of North America, the D.C. Circuit considered when
an injury resulting from asbestos exposure occurred.2 6 The Keene
court noted that, in asbestos-related diseases, the temporal gap
the "periphery." Any cultural or legal assumptions I make reflect an unconscious bias.
21. Ugo Mattei, An Opportunity Not to Be Missed. The Future of Comparative Law in
the United States, 46 AM. J. COMp. L. 709, 710 (1998).
22. See Id.; see also SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF
POWER IN THE WORLD EcoNOMY (1996).
23. Strange, supra note 22, at 122.
24. Rob Merkin, Tort and Insurance: Some Insurance Law Perspectives, J. Prof. Negl.
194 (2010).
25. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 667 F.2d 1034, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
James F. Hogg, The Tale of a Tail, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 515, 539 (1998) (stating that
Keene was the first case to recognize the continuous trigger).
26. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1040.
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between exposure and manifestation made the exact time of bodily
injury prohibitively difficult to discern.27 Thus, because "inhalation
may continue through numerous policy periods, the disease may
develop during subsequent policy periods, and manifestation may
occur in yet another policy period . .. different insurers are likely to
be on the risk at different points in the development of each
plaintiffs disease."28
The Keene court further explained that, although insurance
policies failed to directly address progressive injury, the policies
must be interpreted in "a manner that is equitable and administratively
feasible and that is consistent with insurance principles, insurance law,
and the terms of the contracts themselves."29 The court explained that
comprehensive general liability insurance policies represent an
exchange of uncertain loss for certain loss; the insurer assumes the
insured's uncertain legal liability for the certain premium payment.30
Thus, "at the heart of the transaction is the insured's purchase of
certainty - a valuable commodity."3 1
With this framework in mind, the Keene court held that the
language of commercial general liability policies was ambiguous and
thus construed the policies as providing coverage in favor of the
insured.32 The court interpreted "'bodily injury' to mean any part of
the single injurious process that asbestos-related diseases entail";
because "bodily injury" had occurred during all of the policy periods,
the court held that "inhalation exposure, exposure in residence, and
manifestation all trigger[ed] coverage."33 Accordingly, the insurers
whose policies were effective from the time of exposure through the
time of manifestation were jointly and severally liable for the
insured's loss.34
In the years following Keene, twelve states adopted the
continuous injury trigger for determining coverage for progressive
injury.35 In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral Insurance Co., the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1041.
30. Id.
31. Keene, 667 F.2d. at 1041.
32. Id. at 1046.
33. Id. at 1046-47.
34. Id. at 1047-50.
35. As the California Supreme Court noted in Montrose, the states of New Jersey,
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Supreme Court of California held that express policy language
supported application of the continuous injury trigger. The insurance
policy in Montrose defined "occurrence" as accidents including
"continuous or repeated exposure to conditions."36 The Montrose
court held that this language "unambiguously distinguishe[d]
between the causative event - an accident or 'continuous and
repeated exposure to conditions' - and the resulting 'bodily injury or
property damage."'37 Thus, bodily injuries that were alleged to
progress from continuous exposure and that occurred during the
policy period triggered coverage under the policy.3 8
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Hawaii, Oregon and Delaware have all adopted the
continuous injury trigger for cases of progressive injury or property damage. Montrose, 913
P.2d at 902 n. 22 (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (1994)
(holding, unanimously that the continuous injury trigger is appropriate for asbestos related
claims for both bodily injury and property damage); Trustees of Tufts Univ. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 68, 74 (1993) (rejecting the manifestation trigger and
concluding that "coverage may be triggered before discovery or manifestation of the
damage"); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (1993)
(adopting the continuous injury trigger and noting that "it seems more accurate to regard all
stages of the disease process as bodily injury sufficient to trigger the insurers' obligation to
indemnify, as all phases independently meet the policy definition of bodily injury");
Harford Cnty. v. Harford Mutual Ins. Co., 610 A.2d 286, 294-295 (1992) (rejecting use of
only the manifestation trigger); Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 917 (1994)
(adopting the injury-in-fact trigger but holding that in cases of injury occurring over time
where multiple insurers are on risk the continuous injury trigger is appropriate); St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 870 P.2d 260, 264-265
(1994) (adopting a continuous injury trigger for a toxic waste spill); Harleysville Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Sussex Cnty., 831 F.Supp. 1111, 1124 (D.Del.1993) (applying Delaware law to hold
that the continuous injury trigger is appropriate in toxic waste cases because like in asbestos
cases it is "impossible to identify a precise point in time when property damage occurs from
the leaching of pollutants")). In addition to the states cited by Montrose however, Illinois,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin have adopted the continuous injury trigger. MARTINEZ &
RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 470 (citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d
1226 (1994); N. States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994);
Soc'y Ins. v. Town ofFranklin, 607 N.W.2d 342 (2000)).
36. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 890 (internal quotations omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court explained that the "conceptual underpinning of
the continuous-trigger theory, then, is that injury occurs during each phase of environmental
contamination-exposure, exposure in residence (defined as further progression of injury
even after exposure has ceased), and manifestation of disease." Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at
981.
2016] 287
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B. Policy Considerations and Implications ofApplication
As the Keene court noted, the continuous injury trigger
maximizes coverage and ensures the insured receives the benefit of
her bargain.3 9 While the goal of maximizing coverage is used by
many courts to support adoption of the continuing injury trigger, it is
not the exclusive policy justification.4 0 Other courts have followed
Keene in holding that Commercial General Liability Policy language
is ambiguous in regard to progressive or continuing injury or damage
and thus must always be construed in favor of the insured.4 1
By contrast, the Montrose court held that the continuous injury
trigger gives effect to policy language chosen by the insurers in
occurrence-based liability policies when an injury progresses over
time.42 The Montrose court explained that the standard form
commercial general liability policy language "provides liability
coverage for damage or injury occurring during the policy period
which results from an accident, or from continuous or repeated
exposure to injurious conditions."43 Because the standard form
commercial general liability policy language defines "occurrence" as
including accidents that occur over time and an insurer "remains
obligated to indemnify the insured for the entirety of the ensuing
damage or injury," continuous injury or damage "throughout more
than one policy period is potentially covered by all policies in effect
during those periods."4 4 Moreover, the California Supreme Court
noted that adopting the continuous injury trigger for claims of
continuous or progressively deteriorating damage or injury does not
undermine the insurer's interest in predictability for underwriting
practices.4 5
In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., the New Jersey
Supreme Court appeared to apply the continuous injury trigger out of
39. Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041.
40. James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate
over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REv. 625, 648-50 (1997).
41. Id. at 649 (citing AC&S, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.
1985)).
42. Montrose, 913 P.2d at 902.
43. Id. at 901.
44. Id. at 901-02.
45. Id. at 902.
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necessity.46 The Owens-Illinois court reasoned that the nature of
mass tort exposures necessitates the use of the continuous injury
trigger because to assign each tort claim to a particular policy would
be impractical.4 7 The Owens-Illinois court explained that "concepts
of legal causation were developed in an age of Newtonian physics,
not of molecular biology."48 If it were possible to know the exact
moment the injury occurred, the court "might be more confident that
occurrence-causing damages had taken place during a particular
policy period. The limitations of science in that respect only
compound the limitations of law ... [m]ass-exposure toxic-tort cases
have simply exceeded the capacity of conventional models of
judicial response."49 The continuous injury trigger responds to this
intersection of legal and scientific limitation by providing a workable
mechanism that provides insureds and tort victims adequate
redress.50
Moreover, the continuous injury trigger is thought to serve the
competing interests of the insured and insurer by providing
predictability to insurers and indemnification to insureds." Under the
Owens-Illinois view, the continuous injury trigger's unique ability to
respond to legal and scientific limitations surrounding continuous
injury or harm provides consistency otherwise lacking in other courts'
approaches to continuous injury.5 2 The Owens-Illinois court rejected
the Keene court's rationale of maximizing coverage as adequate
justification for use of the continuous injury trigger, stating that "[a]
more consistent principle is required."53 The continuous injury trigger,
viewed as a necessary solution to the particular trigger of coverage
issues resulting from a single continuous injury insured by multiple
insurers, provides consistency to insureds and insurers alike.54
Whatever its justification, the choice to employ the continuous





51. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1, 25 (App. Div. 1993) rev'd on
other grounds, 650 A.2d 974 (1994); Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other
Insurance, " Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1373, 1432 (1995).
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injury trigger has substantial implications.5 In the United States, as
the Keene court observed, application of the continuous injury trigger
maximizes coverage for the insured.56 When multiple insurers are
liable for a given injury, the insured's redress varies depending on
the jurisdiction.5 7 In some jurisdictions, the insurers are jointly and
severally liable up to the insurers' respective policy limits subject to
apportionment between the insurers at a later date." In other
jurisdictions, insureds are permitted to "stack" the policies and
aggregate the policy limits to reach full indemnification.59
Accordingly, the application of the continuous injury trigger greatly
expands the resources available to indemnify the insured and
compensate the injured party.
Courts in the United States have thus adopted the continuous
injury trigger in an effort to maximize coverage for the insured and
provide a workable solution to the problems that arise when multiple
insurers are on risk for a single continuing injury. The continuous
injury trigger honors the purposes for which parties to an insurance
policy contract without doing violence to policy language.
IV. The United Kingdom
A. Legal Bases for Recognizing the Multiple Trigger
In the liability insurance context, courts in the United Kingdom
have also tackled the question of when coverage is triggered for an
injury resulting from asbestos exposure that is sustained over multiple
years and policies.6 0 Beginning in 2003, courts in the United
55. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 523-25; MARTINEz & RICHMOND, supra
note 1, at 446-51 (citing Montrose, 913 P.2d at 890).
56. See Nicholas R. Andrea, Exposure, Manifestation of Loss, Injury-in-Fact,
Continuous Trigger: The Insurance Coverage Quagmire, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 813, 852 (1994).
57. See Id.
58. Richmond, supra note 51, at 1436-38; but see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-
Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 1226 n. 28 (6th Cir. 1980) (rejecting joint and several
liability).
59. See LEO P. MARTINEZ, THE ALLOCATION OF COSTS IN MULTI-INSURER CASES
SPANNING MULTIPLE YEARS: THE DECEPTIVELY SIMPLE PROBLEM OF DEFENSE COSTS, NEW
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 53 (Fall 2012);
MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 2, at 446-51; State v. Cont' Ins. Co., 55 Cal.4th 186,
192 (2012).
60. CLARKE, supra note 4, at 195.
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Kingdom have moved toward the adoption of a "triple trigger" or
"multiple trigger" rule for causation in tort actions.6 1 In the United
Kingdom, the "multiple trigger" provides indemnity from any policy
in effect at the time of initial exposure, during exposure, and at the
time of manifestation.62
The House of Lords in Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services
Limited began the United Kingdom's move toward recognition of the
"multiple trigger."63 In Fairchild, the House of Lords considered
which defendants were liable for exposing the injured parties to
asbestos when exposure happened over a period of years and by
multiple defendants.64 The court held that, where employers cannot
identify the period during which exposure to asbestos occurred, the
causation element is satisfied if the employer materially increased
the risk of contracting the mesothelioma.65
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom - previously
the House of Lords - reexamined Fairchild in Barker v. Corus.6 6
Subsequently in 2011, the Court expanded on this line of cases in
Sienkiewicz v. Greif67 In Barker, a majority held that an employer was
not jointly and severally liable for exposing an employee to asbestos;
rather, the Barker majority held that liability between employers
should be apportioned according to that employer's contribution to the
risk.68 In other words, the employer's liability was limited to the
amount of damage the employer caused. Lord Roger dissented,
arguing that the appropriate test for causation should be broad rather
than a strict but-for test and should thus impose joint and several
liability rather than apportioned liability.69
Parliament, however, swiftly passed the Compensation Act 2006
and rejected apportionment of liability under Barker.70 The
Compensation Act 2006 held employers jointly and severally liable
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 32.
64. Id. at 35-36.
65. Id. at 32.
66. [20061 UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572.
67. [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 A.C. 229.
68. Id. at 235.
69. Id. at 285-86.
70. CLARKE, supra note 4, at 196.
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for damages and provided that employers should work out
apportionment and contribution later.71 Parliament's passage of the
act explicitly endorsed Lord Roger's dissent from Barker, which
stated one need only "prove that the risk [of contracting
mesothelioma] has been increased" to satisfy tort causation.72
In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom considered
the applicability of Fairchild and its progeny to insurer liability in
Durham v. BAI (Run off) Ltd., the so-called "Trigger Litigation."7 3
The Trigger Litigation addressed two specific issues.74 First, the
Supreme Court considered if, under the applicable policy language,
the injury had been "sustained" or "contracted" upon exposure to
asbestos or if the language necessarily limited coverage to the time
when mesothelioma was first manifested. Second, the Supreme
Court considered whether the Fairchild principle could be applied to
the determination of whether the injury was "sustained" or
"contracted" during the policy period - that is, whether the causation
element of the tort leading to liability was satisfied.76
On the first issue, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the
injury was "sustained" or "contracted" upon exposure to asbestos
and not only when the injury manifested. The Court explained that
interpreting injury to occur upon exposure gave effect to the
commercial purpose of the policy and indemnified the insured for
conduct during the policy period.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on
contract interpretation principles it had set forth in Rainy Sky SA v.
Kookmin Bank.79 In Rainy Sky, Lord Clarke held that the aim of
interpreting a provision in a contract is to give effect to the language
the parties used by "ascertaining what a reasonable person would
have understood the parties to have meant."so When facing more
71. Id.
72. Barker, supra note 66 at 574.
73. [2012] UKSC 14.
74. Id. at [3].
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at [73].
78. Id. at [74].
79. Gary Meggitt, The "Rock of Uncertainty": Mesothelioma, Insurers and the Courts,
J.B.L. 2013, 6, 563-584, 573 (2013); Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank, [2011] UKSC 50 [14].
80. Rainy Sky SA v. Kookmin Bank, [2011] UKSC 50.
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than one interpretation, it is "generally appropriate to adopt the
interpretation which is most consistent with business common
sense."" Thus, the Trigger Litigation court held that to interpret
"sustained" or "contracted" as referring only to when an injury
becomes manifest would flout the purpose of the insurance policy
because it would render the policyholder underinsured.82
The Supreme Court was divided on the second issue.8 3 Lord
Mance gave the leading opinion and held that "each person who has,
in breach of duty, been responsible for exposing the victim to a
significant quantity of asbestos dust and thus creating a 'material
increase in risk' of the victim contracting the disease will be held to
be jointly and severally liable in respect of the disease."84 Lord
Mance concluded that "for the purposes of the insurances [sic],
liability for mesothelioma following upon exposure to asbestos
created during an insurance period involves a sufficient 'weak' or
'broad' causal link for the disease to be regarded as 'caused' within
the insurance period."ss
Like the Owens-Illinois court in the United States, Lord Mance
justified his position, in part, because of necessity.86 According to
Lord Mance, because so little is known about the progression of
asbestos exposure into mesothelioma, the weak causal link ensures
that victims are compensated.8 ' Lord Mance further observed that the
purpose of the liability insurance contract was to "respond to
whatever liability the insured employers might be held to incur
within the scope of the risks insured and within the period in respect
of which they were insured."88 Thus, allowing an insurer to escape
liability because the employer failed to establish but-for causation
during the policy period would undermine the purpose of the liability
insurance contract.89 As one scholar noted, the Trigger Litigation
brings the United Kingdom "closer to the 'multiple trigger' concept
81. Id. at [30].
82. [2012] UKSC 14 [50]; Meggitt, supra note 79, at 573.
83. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14.
84. Id. at [5].
85. Id. at [73].
86. Id.; Nicholas Bevan, A Return to Common Sense, J.P.I. LAW, 4, 209-218, 216 (2012).
87. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14 [73-74]; Bevan, supra note 86, at
217.
88. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14 [69]; Meggitt, supra note 79, at 577.
89. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14 [69]; Meggitt, supra note 79, at 578.
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applied in the United States."90
B. Policy Considerations and Implications ofApplication
In the Trigger Litigation, the Supreme Court had little trouble
with interpreting the insurance contracts as providing coverage from
exposure through manifestation.91 The Court's desire to give effect to
the insurance contract's commercial purpose apparently serves two
ends. First, the Trigger Litigation mirrors the Keene court's desire to
ground coverage triggers in the fundamental purpose of insurance
contracts. Second, the Supreme Court's holding that insurers are
jointly and severally liable for asbestos-related claims maximizes
coverage for the insured.92
The Supreme Court's treatment of the second issue, causation,
presented a more difficult question.93 The Court expressly named
necessity and honoring the purpose of purchasing indemnity as
justifications for adopting a broader causation rule in mesothelioma
cases.94 The Court's adoption of the broad causal link, however,
might also be explained by the fact that defendants in asbestos
related cases tend to be insured.95 One Judge, Lord Denning, in a rare
acknowledgement of the influence of the existence of insurance on
tort decisions, explained that courts "would not find negligence so
readily ... except on the footing that the damages are to be borne ...
by the insurance company."96
The implications of recognizing the multiple trigger in the
United Kingdom are less clear. Because such recognition is recent in
the United Kingdom, it is unclear whether courts will allow insureds
to stack policies and aggregate policy limits. Joint and several
liability favors insureds because they are allowed multiple avenues
90. Bevan, supra note 86, at 217.
91. See Zurich Insurance PLC v. International Energy Group Ltd., [2015] UKSC 33
(analyzing the "Trigger" litigation).
92. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14.
93. See Zurich Insurance PLC v. International Energy Group Ltd., [2015] UKSC 33.
94. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14 [69].
95. Richard Lewis, The Relationship Between Tort Law and Insurance in the United
Kingdom and Wales, in TORT AND INSURANCE LAW 61-63 (Gehard Wagner & Tom Baker,
eds. 2005).
96. Id. at 62 (quoting Morris v. Ford Motor Co. [1973] Q.B. 792 at 798 (Eng.)).
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for redress.97 Indeed, the Trigger Litigation and Compensation Act
2006's adoption of joint and several liability falls in line with the
United Kingdom's well-established law on double insurance. Under
the United Kingdom's double insurance rules, insurers are jointly
and severally liable for injuries for which they are on risk during
overlapping policy periods.98 Each insurer is liable up to the amount
of the policy limit, but the insured may not recover more than the
total amount of the loss.99 Each insurer's share of the loss is later
worked out among the insurers whose policies are triggered.00
Nothing in the United Kingdom's law on double insurance suggests
that insureds will be barred from stacking or be anything but fully
indemnified.10' Accordingly, although the multiple trigger is thus far
limited to asbestos exposure cases, full indemnity for insureds and
full compensation for victims is favored.
The United Kingdom has recognized the multiple trigger to
address the problem of multiple insurers on risk for a continuous
injury, to maximize compensation to victims of asbestos exposure.
This recognition, however, has not come at the expense of fidelity to
principles of contract interpretation, but rather the multiple trigger is
recognized in in an effort to give effect to the purpose of insurance
contracts: indemnity. The United Kingdom's recognition of the
multiple trigger, then, appears to be on a similar trajectory followed
by the United States. At very least, nothing in the United Kingdom's
courts' actions suggests a diversion from this path.
V. Comparative Analysis
While both the United States and the United Kingdom recognize
a variation of the continuous injury trigger for injury sustained over
multiple insurance policies, the countries' approaches differ in
significant ways. First, and aside from the fact that the United
Kingdom's recognition of the multiple trigger is more recent,'02 the




100. Id. at 588.
101. See Roger Kay, Recent Developments in Insurance Law, COVENTRY L.J. 2003, 8(2),
26-30, 27-29; MACGILLIVRAYsupra note 97, at 573-97.
102. Compare dates of decisions for BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14
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United Kingdom's recognition of the trigger is significantly more
limited than in the United States.10 3 In the United Kingdom,
recognition of a multiple trigger is thus far limited to asbestos
exposure claims. 10 4 In the United States, by contrast, the continuous
injury trigger has been applied to cases involving situations ranging
from property encroachment o leaking swimming pools to long-term
environmental harm.0 5
Moreover, the countries' respective approaches for recognizing
the trigger differ significantly. The United Kingdom has no apparent
difficulty interpreting policy language to authorize application of the
multiple trigger; instead, it has more difficulty conforming the
approach to traditional tort causation principles.10 6 In the United
States, by contrast, jurisdictions that recognize the continuous injury
trigger base application squarely on contract principles.'0 7 This
distinction may be trivial, but it may signal a general reluctance in
the United Kingdom to broaden the scope of risks for which insureds
may be liable.
The United Kingdom and the United States cite, however,
similar policy justifications for applying the continuous injury
trigger.0 s Both countries are concerned with honoring the purpose of
and Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, (D.C. Cir. 1981); It should be
reiterated that he United States' recognition of the continuous injury trigger, while older, is
by no means the majority rule in the United States. See supra, note 34.
103. Bevan, supra note 86, at 217.
104. Id.
105. Borg v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 47 Cal.App.4th 448, 461 (1996) (applying the
continuous injury trigger to trigger to property damage caused by structural encroachment
from the insured's property); Calfornia Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145
Cal.App.3d 462, 476 (1983) (holding that where a swimming pool leak caused property
damage spanning two policy periods both insurers were jointly and severally liable for the
damage caused); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 268 Ill.App.3d 598, 646 (1994)
(applying the continuous injury trigger to property damage caused by continued exposure to
asbestos fibers); State v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 281 P.3d 1000, 1002 (Cal. 2012), as modified
(Sept. 19, 2012) (applying the continuous injury trigger to toxic waste contamination
occurring over a twelve-year period).
106. See Zurich Insurance PLC v. International Energy Group Ltd., [2015] UKSC 33
(analyzing the "Trigger" litigation).
107. See Montrose, 913 P.2d at 890; James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass
Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REv.
625, 649 (1997) (citing AC&S, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir.
1985)).
108. See James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The
Debate over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REv. 625, 648-50 (1997); BAI
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the insurance contract: the insured's indemnity.10 9 Both countries
also cite necessity as a compelling reason for adopting the multiple
trigger.1 10 Thus, both countries are concerned with the scope of
indemnity available to the insured and, by extension, the damages
available to the victim of injury or property damage.
The extent of indemnity in both the United States and the United
Kingdom remains unclear. In the United States, the question of
apportionment of indemnity among insurers is complicated."' And,
while some courts in the United States permit the insured to stack
insurance policies to fully indemnify the loss from continuing injury
or damage, stacking is jurisdiction dependent.1 1 2 The United
Kingdom applies a joint and several liability approach, but it has yet
to consider whether stacking is implicit under the country's double
insurance rules. Thus, while the continuous injury or multiple trigger
maximizes coverage for the insured, it is not clear in either the
United States or the United Kingdom whether this will always lead
to complete indemnification.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the United Kingdom will
continue to limit the multiple trigger's application to asbestos cases.
Prolonged limitation will adversely affect insureds. Lord Mance's
observation in the Trigger Litigation - that limiting liability for
asbestos exposure to cases where but-for causation can be proven
would undermine the purpose of insurance contracts - suggests the
United Kingdom's recognition of the multiple trigger will not be
limited to asbestos cases indefinitely.1 13 Indeed, such a limitation in
the context of continuous injury over multiple policy periods would
undermine the insurance contract's ability to "respond to whatever
liability the insured employers might be held to incur within the
scope of the risks insured and within the period in respect of which
they were insured."1 14 Like the United States, the United Kingdom
(Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14; Meggitt, supra note 79, at 216.
109. See Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041; BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14;
Meggitt, supra note 79, at 216.
110. Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 985; See Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd, [2012] UKSC
14; Meggitt, supra note 79, at 216.
111. LEO P. MARTINEZ, THE ALLOCATION OF COSTS IN MULTI-INSURER CASES SPANNING
MULTIPLE YEARS: THE DECEPTIVELY SIMPLE PROBLEM OF DEFENSE COSTS, NEW APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAw 53 (Fall 2012).
112. MARTINEZ & RICHMOND, supra note 1, at 444.
113. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14; Meggitt, supra note 79, at 577.
114. BAI (Run Off) Ltd. v. Durham [2012] JKSC 14] [69]; Meggitt, supra note 79, at 577.
2016] 297
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
seems to be approaching broader recognition of the multiple trigger.
VI. Conclusion
Despite the temporal difference and thus the difference in scope
of recognition of the continuous injury trigger, both the United States
and the United Kingdom have cited similar justifications for their
applications. Courts in both jurisdictions have employed the
continuous injury trigger out of "necessity" to address the problem of
multiple insurers for a single continuous injury. Courts in both
jurisdictions have used contract interpretation principles to apply the
continuous injury trigger to multiple insurers on risk for a continuous
injury occurring over a number of years. Finally, courts in the United
Kingdom and the United States have applied the continuous injury
trigger to give effect to the purpose of insurance contracts and affirm
compensation for the insured.
As the foregoing reflects, the current state of the law on the
continuous injury trigger in the United States and the United Kingdom
is not clear, uniform, or comprehensive. Against the landscape of our
globalizing world, moving toward uniformity and clarity in
particularly complicated areas of the law is important. As the world
gets smaller and insurance transactions increasingly occur across
borders, insurance companies and insureds alike benefit from clear
insurance law principles. Perhaps chief among these principals are
those guiding the "when" of indemnification obligations. The "when"
of coverage in the context of continuous injury informs the scope and
extent of compensation available to the insured. Thus, the application
of triggers of coverage goes to the heart of the liability insurance
transaction: "the insured's purchase of certainty - a valuable
commodity.""
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